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COMMENTS
EXTENSION OF STRICT TORT LIABILITY TO
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS
In 1973 an employee was injured while operating a machine
at his place of employment. This machine had been manufac-
tured by Company S and sold to the employer in 1964. In 1967
Company S had sold all or substantially all of its assets to
Company B, for cash, and Company S was dissolved soon after
the sale. In 1975, when the injured employee notified Company
B of his claim, the issue became whether the corporate succes-
sor to the dissolved manufacturer of the defective product
could be held liable.
The concept of strict tort liability for the manufacture of
defective products was first adopted by the California Supreme
Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.' and later
codified in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2
A majority of states have adopted strict tort liability either by
judicial decree or statute, although they do not all precisely
follow the Restatement rule.3 Since 1963, the theory of strict
tort products liability has undergone various expansions, from
1. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See also 13 A.L.R.3d 1049
(1967). Justice Traynor wrote the majority opinion for the court stating the same
principles he had noted in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 460, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
2. RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) reads as follows:
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
3. Only Alabama, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Utah, Virginia and Wyo-
ming have not yet adopted the strict tort liability doctrine. 1 PROD. LLxA. REP. (CCH)
4070 (Mar. 1977).
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the extension of protection to innocent bystanders4 to liability
for improper design' and failure to warn.6
When dealing with the liability of successor corporations,
the doctrine of strict tort liability overlaps and conflicts with
corporate law theories. This is an area where the doctrine of
strict tort liability is now apparently undergoing further expan-
sion. This comment will discuss (1) the corporate law used in
most jurisdictions to determine successor liability, (2) the
emerging theory of strict liability in tort for successor corpora-
tions, and (3) the application of these theories in Wisconsin.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wisconsin for a products liability cause of action predi-
cated upon the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the plaintiff
must prove:
(1) [T]hat the product was in defective condition when it
left the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the
defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of the plaintiff's
injuries or damages, (4) that the seller engaged in the busi-
ness of selling such product or, put negatively, that this is not
an isolated or infrequent transaction not related to the princi-
pal business of the seller, and (5) that the product was one
which the seller expected to and did reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition it was
when he sold it.7
Assuming the plaintiff could prove all of the above ele-
ments, the question becomes one of determining whom should
he sue. Product liability claims have been successfully asserted
against manufacturers,8 component suppliers,9 distributors,'0
4. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973); Howes v. Hansen, 56
Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
5. Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
6. Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974).
7. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
8. Wheeler v. Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 359 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Van-
dermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (both
manufacturer and seller were held liable); Fink v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 16 Ill. App.
3d 886, 308 N.E.2d 838 (1974); Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., 59 N.J. 365, 283 A.2d
321 (1971) (per curiam), aff'g 113 N.J. Super. 279, 273 A.2d 606 (1971) (both manufac-
turer and dealer were potentially liable); Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis.
2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974). See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liabil-
ity to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rv. 791, 814 (1965-1966) [hereinafter cited as
Prosser].
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retailers,' bailors,'2 lessors,' 3 and even building developers.'4
However, the ultimate defendant is usually the manufacturer,
whether the injured plaintiff sues the manufacturer directly or
whether a defendant sues the manufacturer under a theory of
contribution or indemnification. A substantial problem is en-
countered, however, when the original manufacturer has
ceased to exist. If the original company has been dissolved but
the business is continued by a second company, should the
successor corporation be liable for the torts of its predecessor?
A successor is broadly defined as "[o]ne that succeeds or
follows; one who takes the place that another has left, and
sustains the like part or character."' 5
9. McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965); Hiigel v. General
Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Clark v. Bendix Corp., 42 App. Div. 2d 727, 345 N.Y.S.2d 662
(1973); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d
866 (1973). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment q (1965);
Prosser, supra note 8, at 814-15 n.125.
10. Little v. Maxam, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Ill. 1970); Canifax v. Hercules
Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965); Pimm v. Graybar Electric
Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 309, 278 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1967); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443,
155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); see also Prosser, supra note 8, at 815-16 n.129. Contra, Ikerd v.
Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1970) (applying Indiana law); Ellis v. Rich's, Inc.,
233 Ga. 573, 212 S.E.2d 373 (1975), aff'g 132 Ga. App. 430, 208 S.E.2d 331 (1974); Sam
Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405
P.2d 502 (1965); Walker v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778 (1971).
11. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964) (both seller and manufacturer were held liable); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp.,
544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975); Housman v. C.A. Dawson & Co., 106 Ill. App. 2d 225, 245
N.E.2d 886 (1969); Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965);
see also Prosser, supra note 8, at 815 n.126. Contra, Ellis v. Rich's Inc., 233 Ga. 573,
212 S.E.2d 373 (1975), aff'g 132 Ga. App. 430, 208 S.E.2d 331 (1974); Sam Shainberg
Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972); Walker v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504, 471
S.W.2d 778 (1971); Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
12. See, e.g., Fulbright v. Klamath Gas Co., 271 Or. 449, 533 P.2d 316 (1975). See
generally cases cited note 13 infra.
13. George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D. Wis. 1976); Bachner v. Pearson, 479
P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Price v- Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245,466 P.2d 722,85 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1970); Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972); Galluc-
cio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Coleman v. Hertz Corp., 534
P.2d 940 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975). Contra, Brookshire v. Florida Bendix Co., 153 So. 2d
55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), cert. dismissed, 163 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1964); Bona v.
Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972).
14. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969);
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Contra, Cox v. Shaffer,
223 Pa. Super. Ct. 429, 302 A.2d 456 (1973).
15. BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNARY 1600 (4th ed. 1951).
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As applied to corporations "successor" does not ordinarily
connote an assignee, but is normally used in respect to corpo-
rate entities, including corporations becoming invested with
the rights and assuming the burdens of another corporation
by amalgamation, consolidation, or duly authorized legal
succession, and does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary
purchase from another corporation . . .
Merely applying these definitions to a fact situation does not
provide a sufficient basis for determining the liability of the
successor corporation; an analysis of the corporate law theories
and the tort doctrine of strict liability is required.
II. CORPORATE LAW
Under corporate law "[t]he general rule, which is well set-
tled, is that where one company sells or otherwise transfers all
its assets to another company, the latter is not liable for the
debts and liabilities of the transferor."' 7 With the introduction
of product liability claims, the general corporate rule of nonlia-
bility was also invoked to limit the liability of successor corpo-
rations for such claims. 8
Exceptions to the general corporate rule were developed to
protect creditors,'9 to protect the rights of dissenting sharehold-
ers20 and to determine liability in tax assessment cases.1 If the
plaintiff can meet any of the following exceptions, 2 the succes-
sor corporation will become liable for its predecessor's liabili-
ties, including its tort liability. The exceptions to the general
rule are these:
16. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 328 S.W.2d 778,
781 (Tex. 1959).
17. 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (rev.
perm. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
18. Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971). See also
FLETCHER, supra note 17, at § 7123.
19. Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L.
REV. 86, 91 (1975); 44 TENN. L. REV. 905, 908 (1977).
20. Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146
(1960).
21. West Tex. Ref. & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1933).
22. FLETCHER, supra note 17, at § 7122. There is a fifth exception which some
jurisdictions recognize: the transfer was made without adequate consideration to meet
creditor's claims. See, e.g., Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 100 N.J. Super. 186,
241 A.2d 471 (1968). See also Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 824, 850-53 (1975); Annot., 49
A.L.R.3d 881, 890-95 (1973).
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(1) The purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly
agreed to assume such obligations;2
(2) the transaction amounted to a consolidation or merger; 24
(3) the purchasing corporation was merely a continuation of
the selling corporation;2
(4) the transaction was fraudulently entered into to escape
liability. 26
Prior to Ray v. Alad Corp. ,27 the courts generally decided
the issue of the liability of successor corporations under the
rules of corporate law. In their attempts to apply corporate
principles to what actually were tort claims, some courts
grossly manipulated the general rule and its exceptions to
achieve results in accord with the public policy behind strict
tort liability. On the other hand, some courts have refused to
expand the corporate principles to impose tort liability upon
successor corporations. As a result, some plaintiffs have re-
covered against successor corporations while other plaintiffs,
having similar claims, have been denied recovery. The lack of
uniformity in this area can be seen by examining some of the
representative case law in this area.2 8
23. Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970). The court found
the broad assumption of liabilities by the buyer under the sales contract included the
risk of insuring against claims arising from future accidents. As evidence of this, the
court noted that the selling corporation's products liability insurance policy was trans-
ferred to the purchasing corporation and expired after the transfer date. Id. at 651-52.
See also Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 824, 834-38 (1975).
24. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich.
1974). In a consolidation a new corporation is created with the termination of the
constituents. In a merger one corporation is absorbed by the other, which retains its
corporate identity and name. FLETCHER, supra note 17, at § 7041. See also Annot., 66
A.L.R.3d 824, 838-45 (1975).
25. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Annot., 66
A.L.R.3d 824, 845-50 (1975).
26. United States v. Plastic Electro-Finishing Corp., 313 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y.
1970). See also Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 884-87 (1973).
27. 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976), vacated, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d
3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
28. See also Elser, Products Liability - Liability of Successor Corporations, 12
FORUM 928 (1976-1977); Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22
WAYNE L. REv. 39 (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as Juenger & Schulman]; Note,
Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REv. 86 (1975);
Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1305 (1975-1976); 6 SEroN HALL L. REv. 477 (1974-1975); 49 TEMP. L.Q. 1014 (1975-
1976); 44 TENN. L. REv. 905 (1977); 30 VAD. L. Rxv. 238 (1977); Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d
824 (1975).
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Im. CASES APPLYING CORPORATE LAW
A. Successor Corporations Not Liable
In Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co.," the court held
that a successor corporation was not liable for the defective
equipment manufactured by its predecessor. The court upheld
the traditional corporate law rule and exceptions, including the
limitation of the "continuation" exception to reorganizations. °
In reaching its decision, the court noted the following factors:
(1) Only certain of the predecessor's properties were acquired;3'
(2) only certain liabilities were assumed by the purchasing cor-
poration; (3) it was an arm's length transaction; (4) there was
adequate consideration; 32 (5) there was no mixture of officers
or stockholders; (6) no hint of fraud; and (7) the selling corpo-
ration maintained its corporate existence for some time after
the sales transaction. 33
Three years later, in Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co.,31
another successor corporation was found not to be liable for
injuries caused by a defective product manufactured by its
predecessor. Although the doctrine of strict liability in tort was
adopted during this three-year period, this court based its deci-
sion on principles of corporate law. None of the elements of the
exceptions to the general corporate rule of nonliability were
found to exist where: (1) Only part of the assets were sold;3 1 (2)
only certain liabilities were assumed; 31 (3) valuable and ade-
29. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
30. Id. at 821. See also FLETCHER, supra note 17, at § 7122.
31. 288 F. Supp. at 819. The assets transferred included furniture, fixtures, inven-
tory, equipment, machinery, vehicles, licenses, trademarks, patents, good will and the
right to use selling corporation's name. The selling corporation retained cash, accounts
receivable, real estate and other assets. Id.
32. Purchasing corporation paid over one million dollars in cash. Id.
33. Id. at 819, 821-22. The selling corporation operated for ten months under a new
name. Id. at 820.
34. 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1971). See also 66 A.L.R.3d 808 (1975).
35. 14 Cal. App. 3d at 776, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 780-81. The purchasing corporation
acquired certain machinery, equipment, inventory, trademarks and patents and good
will of seller. Id.
See also Bazan v. Kux Machine Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973), where
the successor corporation was held not liable for injuries caused by a defective machine
manufactured by its predecessor. Only certain tangible assets were transferred: fix-
tures, inventory, good will and the right to use the selling corporation's name. The
physical premises were not sold. There was no exchange of stock. Id. at 1251. The court
found this transaction was a sale and the general corporate rule of nonliability was
applicable. Id. at 1252.
36. 14 Cal. App. 3d at 776, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 781. The purchasing corporation as-
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quate consideration was paid;37 and (4) the selling corporation
possessed substantial assets and continued to exist for some
time after the transaction.
In the first two cases discussed, only a portion of the seller's
assets had been transferred to the buyer. In McKee v. Harris-
Seyboid Co.," the purchasing corporation acquired all of the
selling corporation's assets: lands, buildings, machinery, trade
name, good will, etc. The purchasing corporation continued to
manufacture the same product and employed three key em-
ployees of the selling corporation." The McKee court refused
to expand the corporate rules and held that the successor cor-
poration was not liable for the injury caused by the defective
product. The court based its decision on the following factors:
(1) It was essentially a cash sale; stock played only a minute
part in the transaction;42 (2) the selling corporation remained
in existence for over a year;43 (3) the entire corporate entity was
not absorbed, but only the manufacturing operations; (4) the
two corporations remained separate and distinct before and
after the sale; and (5) there was no broad assumption of liabili-
ties in the sales contract.44
sumed a product warranty which guaranteed the products for one year against defec-
tive materials or workmanship. The court stated this was a customary warranty of
manufacturers and could not include strict tort liability because at the time the con-
tract was entered into California had not yet adopted the doctrine of strict tort liabil-
ity. Id. at 780, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
37. Id. at 781, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 784. The consideration was cash and the lease of
the plant facilities. Id. at 776, 779, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 781, 783.
38. Id. at 781, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 784. The selling corporation retained the real prop-
erty and leased it to the purchasing corporation. Id. at 776, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
39. 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480,
288 A.2d 585 (1972).
40. 109 N.J. Super. at -, 264 A.2d at 106.
41. Id.
42. The total consideration paid was two million dollars in cash and 5,500 shares
of stock. Id. at _ 264 A.2d at 107. See also Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 405
F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1975) where the successor was not liable for the injuries
caused by the defective cockpit frame manufactured by its predecessor because the
court found there was no de facto merger. There was no identity of officers, directors,
or principal stockholders. The consideration involved constituted two percent of the
selling corporation's stock; thus, the court found little shareholder continuity. Id. at
1022.
43. While the selling corporation maintained its corporate existence, under a differ-
ent name, it was restricted from conducting manufacturing operations by the sales
contract. 109 N.J. Super. at -, 264 A.2d at 104.
44. Id. The purchasing corporation agreed to assume the obligations of the selling
corporation incurred "in the usual course of its manufacturing business, but not other-
wise." The court found this language restricted the liabilities assumed by the purchas-
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The McKee decision was followed in Lopata v. Bemis Co.45
and Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe.46 The court in Lopata stated
that the factual situation presented to them was not distin-
guishable from McKee; therefore, following the general corpo-
rate rule of nonliability, the successor corporation was not lia-
ble for the defective product manufactured by its predecessor."
One of the key elements in Lopata was the fact that it was a
cash transaction. The Lopata court used this feature to distin-
guish it from Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.4" where the
consideration for the sale was common stock of the purchasing
corporation. 9 The successor corporation in Shannon was held
liable under the de facto merger doctrine.
The basic premise behind the holding in Ortiz was that the
plaintiff should attempt to recover, if permitted under Indiana
law, from the directors and shareholders of the selling corpora-
tion.51 In effect, this placed the plaintiff in the same position
as if the original manufacturer had dissolved without selling
the business. Like the court in Lopata, the Ortiz court held
that the case was not factually distinguishable from McKee
and that liability for the defective product should not attach
to the successor corporation.2 The two corporate entities were
completely separate and distinct both before and after the sale.
There was ample consideration, no fraud and no assumption of
liabilities. 3 In addition, the Ortiz court relied on Schwartz v.
McGraw-Edison Co. 4 for the principle that the transfer of the
selling corporation's trade name, customer lists and good will
are inconsequential in determining liability of the successor
ing corporation and that contingent tort liability was not expressly or impliedly as-
sumed. Id. at _ 264 A.2d at 102-03. But see Bouton v. Litton Indust., Inc., 423 F.2d
643 (3d Cir. 1970) (applying New York law) where the court found a broad assumption
of liabilities and held that the successor corporation was potentially liable for products
liability claims. Id. at 652.
45. 406 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (applying New Jersey law).
46. 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975).
47. 406 F. Supp. at 526-27.
48. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
49. 406 F. Supp. at 527.
50. 379 F. Supp. at 801 (discussed at notes 58-63 infra).
51. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59. The purchasing corporation assumed cer-
tain liabilities other than liability on the selling corporation's products and the sales
agreement recited that the purchasing corporation assumed only those obligations
expressly stated. Id. at 846, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
54. 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1971).
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corporation for defective products.5
The dissent in Ortiz argued that the effect of the majority's
opinion was to put the burden for the defective product on the
intermediary which had sold the machine to the plaintiff's
employer" and that one of the risks inherent in the continuity
of business operations is the risk of product liability claims:
Product liability today has become an integral part of a man-
ufacturing business, and the liability attaches to the business
like fleas to a dog, where it remains imbedded regardless of
changes in ownership of the business. So long as the business
retains its distinctive identity and character and continues to
be operated as it has in the past, defective product liability
adheres to the business and remains there until discharged by
bankruptcy or comparable judicial act.57
B. Successor Corporations Held Liable
The majority of cases holding the successor corporation lia-
ble for the defective products manufactured by its predecessor
under principles of corporate law have done so after finding
that there was a de facto merger or continuation." The key
element of de facto merger is the sale of the business in return
for stock in the purchasing corporation. The continuation ex-
ception, traditionally, was limited to reorganizations. How-
ever, when basing their decisions to impose tort liability on the
basis of a continuation, the courts expanded the corporate
theory beyond reorganizations. It is in these cases that the
courts recognize and discuss the public policy behind strict
liability in tort.
Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.59 lists the characteristics
of a de facto merger, as set out in McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Co.,"o as: (1) Continuation of the enterprise; (2) continuity of
55. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
56. Id. at 850, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
57. Id. at 851, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
58. It should.be noted that a bulk sale may be subject to article 6 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Failure to comply with the bulk transfer provisions results in the
purchaser being liable for the seller's obligations. However, it is unclear whether this
extends to tort liability, especially where the injury occurs after the transfer. See
U.C.C. § 6-102(1) & (3). See also 1 L. FRusER & M. FEDMAN, PRODUCTS Lmrnxry §
5.06, at 70.58(8) (1976).
59. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974). See also Juenger & Schulman, supra note
27, at 47.
60. 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480,
288 A.2d 585 (1972) (discussed at notes 38-43 supra).
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shareholders; (3) dissolution of the selling corporation; and (4)
assumption of liabilities by the purchasing corporation. 1 The
court found a de facto merger in this case and distinguished
McKee on the basis that it involved a cash transaction while
the consideration in the Shannon case was stock. 2 In addition,
the Shannon court discussed the public policy behind strict
liability in tort and concluded that the purchasing corporation
"got all the advantages of an established going concern, includ-
ing expertise, reputation, established customers, and so forth.
Public policy requires that Harris Intertype [purchasing cor-
poration], having received the benefits of a going concern,
should also assume the costs which all other going concerns
must ordinarily bear.""3 By dicta, the court stated that adjust-
ments can be made in the purchase price to reflect this liability
and that successor corporations can purchase product liability
insurance to protect themselves.64
A de facto merger was also the basis for imposing liability
upon the successor corporation in Knapp v. North American
Rockwell Corp.65 However, the court stated the test was
"whether, immediately after the transaction, the selling corpo-
ration continued to exist as a corporate entity and whether,
after the transaction, the selling corporation possessed sub-
stantial assets with which to satisfy the demands of its credi-
tors." 6 The factors emphasized by the court in its decision
were: (1) The brief period the selling corporation maintained
its existence; 7 (2) the selling corporation was required to dis-
solve according to the terms of the sales contract; 8 (3) the
61. 379 F. Supp. at 801 (summarizing 264 A.2d at 103-05).
62. 379 F. Supp. at 801.
63. Id. at 802.
64. Id. "[Tihe general rule under the standard products liability insurance policy
is that the policy applies to accidents which occur during the policy period so that the
date of injury, as opposed to the time of the wrongful act, is determinative." 1 L.
FRUmER & M. FRmAN, PRODUCTS LiAmLrry § 5.06, at 70.58 (1976) (footnote omitted).
See also Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability
Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 865, 910-11 (1970-1971).
65. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). See also Juenger
& Schulman, supra note 27, at 49; 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 477 (1974-1975); 49 TEMPLE
L.Q. 1014 (1975-1976).
66. 506 F.2d at 365.
67. The selling corporation did not dissolve until 18 months after the exchange of
assets. Id. at 363.
68. The consideration for the sale was Rockwell stock which the selling corporation
was to distribute to its shareholders and thereafter dissolve the corporate entity as soon
as practicable. Id.
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selling corporation was prohibited from engaging in normal
business transactions; (4) the limited assets retained by the
selling corporation;" g and (5) the insubstantiality of the selling
corporation's continued existence. 0 In support of its holding,
the court relied on the Pennsylvania public policy of placing
the cost on the party better able to spread the loss and procure
insurance to cover such loss. 71
In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,72 the plaintiff was injured when
he entered drying ovens of a printing press. The original manu-
facturer of the ovens was the B. Offen Company, a family
owned corporation. When the founder died, the employees con-
tinued to run the corporation and eventually purchased the
corporation from the executor of his estate.7 3 In expanding the
"continuation" exception to the general corporate rule, the Cyr
court relied on labor law cases to determine "whether there was
sufficient continuity to warrant continued obligation."74 The
court's reliance on these labor cases was not well founded.
The first labor case, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,75
dealt with companies that had merged. 76 Since merger is a
separate exception to the general rule of corporate nonliability,
the factors used to determine whether there was a merger in
Wiley are not the same as the factors used to determine
whether there has been a continuation.
In the second labor case, NLRB v. Burns International Se-
curity Services, Inc. ,7 the court simply held that Burns was
required to arbitrate with the union, but was not bound by the
substantive provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. 78
The union had entered into a collective-bargaining agreement
with Wackenhut Corporation, a company that provided plant
protection service for a Lockheed Aircraft Service Company
factory. Wackenhut's service contract expired. Wackenhut and
69. The selling corporation retained its corporate seal, articles of incorporation,
minute books and other corporate records, certain real estate holdings and cash to
cover transfer expenses. Id.
70. Id. at 367.
71. Id. at 369-70.
72. 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974). See also Juenger & Schulman, supra note 27, at
51.
73. 501 F.2d at 1151.
74. Id. at 1152.
75. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
76. Id. at 545.
77. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
78. Id. at 287.
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Burns both bid for the service contract at Lockheed. The con-
tract was awarded to Burns. There was no sale or transfer be-
tween Wackenhut and Burns. "Bums merely hired enough of
Wackenhut's employees to require it to bargain with the union
... ," Therefore, Burns has even less precedential value for
determining continuity than the Wiley case.
Influential factors in Cyr which led the court to hold the
successor corporation liable under the continuation exception
were: (1) The purchasing corporation assumed other benefits
and liabilities; 81 (2) the purchasing corporation continued to
operate the company as an ongoing business; (3) the purchas-
ing corporation held itself out as the same company; (4) a
number of key employees were hired by the purchasing corpo-
ration; and (5) the same product was manufactured after the
transaction.8' In addition, the Cyr court examined the public
policy behind the imposition of strict liability in tort to justify
its holding:
(1) The manufacturer is better able to protect itself and
bear the costs while the customer is helpless; (2) it is the
manufacturer which has launched the product into the chan-
nels of trade; (3) it is the manufacturer which has violated
the representation of safety implicit in putting the product
into the stream of commerce; and (4) the manufacturer is the
instrumentality to look to for improvement of the product's
quality. 2
Applying these public policy factors to the case of the suc-
cessor corporation, the Cyr court noted that the first and last
public policy considerations apply to successor corporations as
well as to original manufacturers. Although the second and
third considerations do not squarely apply, as the successor
corporation did not directly participate in the activity, the Cyr
court felt that the successor was indirectly responsible because
it had benefited by the use of its predecessor's good will, the
79. Id. at 286.
80. The sales agreement specifically excluded "liability for costs incurred in tort."
501 F.2d at 1151. In addition, the purchasing corporation had the right to recover over
against the selling corporation for any liabilities incurred as a result of injuries sus-
tained due to a product manufactured prior to the sale of the business. The Cyr court
held the agreement between the selling corporation and the purchasing corporation
could not affect the rights of third parties, in this case, the plaintiff. Id. at 1153.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1154.
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continuity of the business and the continuity in the product
line."
Thus, the Cyr court used the public policy behind strict tort
liability' to expand the "continuation" exception of corporate
law. Despite this contorted expansion, Cyr has been followed
in Wilson v. Fare Well Corp.4 and Turner v. Bituminous Cas-
ualty Co.1 5
Following the broad approach of the Cyr court,8 the Wilson
court rejected the narrow interpretation of the de facto merger,
consolidation and continuation doctrines as stated in McKee
v. Harris-Seybold Co."7 The successor corporation in Wilson
was held liable under the de facto merger and continuation
exceptions because of the following factors: (1) One-half of the
purchase price was paid in stock; (2) most of the selling corpo-
ration's liabilities were expressly assumed by the purchasing
corporation; (3) the selling corporation continued as a corpora-
tion but only on a limited basis; and (4) management and
personnel remained the same.88 According to the Wilson court,
The most relevant factor is the degree to which the predeces-
sor's business entity remains intact. The more a corporation
physically resembles its predecessor, and [sic] the more rea-
sonable it is to hold the successor fully responsible. In this
way, the innocent, injured consumer is protected without the
possibility of being left without a remedy due to the subse-
quent corporate history of the manfacturer.5 '
The issue in the Turner case was "whether an acquisition
for cash should be treated the same as an acquisition for stock;
and, if so, under what circumstances."" The court said it
83. Id.
84. 140 N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (1976).
85. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). See also 30 VAND. L. REv. 238, 248
(1977).
86. 140 N.J. Super. at _ 356 A.2d at 465. The Wilson court also relied on Knapp
v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974); Bouton v. Litton Indus.,
Inc., 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797
(W.D. Mich. 1974); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
87. 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480,
288 A.2d 585 (1972).
88. 140 N.J. Super. at -, 356 A.2d at 466-67. Cf. Menacho v. Adamson United
Co., 420 F. Supp. 128 (D.N.J. 1976) (the federal district court refused to impose
liability upon the successor corporation, relying on McKee and declining to follow the
broad interpretation as evidenced in Wilson).
89. 140 N.J. Super. at _ , 356 A.2d at 466.
90. 397 Mich. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 875.
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should "where the totality of the transaction demonstrates a
basic continuity of the enterprise." 9' Although the Turner court
criticized the cases which applied principles of corporate law
to issues of tort liability, it nonetheless relied upon the cases
of Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.92 and Shannon v. Samuel Langston
Co.,13 both of which applied corporate theories of liability. 4
The basic premise of the holding in Turner is continuity:
"Continuity is the purpose, continuity is the watch word, conti-
nuity is the fact. ' 9
As the test of continuity, the Turner court relied on the
first, third and fourth indicia of a de facto merger, which, as
stated in the Shannon case,98 are: (1) Continuity of the entire
enterprise, including personnel, assets, trade name, and gen-
eral business operations;97 (2) dissolution of the selling corpora-
tion; 98 and (3) the assumption of liabilities by the purchasing
corporation.9 The court felt that the transfer of stock was a
factor, but that its absence would not preclude a finding of a
continuation. "I
Products liability is a relatively new doctrine which is still
in the growing stages. The principles of tort law overlap and
conflict with the principles of corporate law where the liability
of successor corporations is involved. Until recently the courts
have decided this issue solely as a question of corporate law
with the result that some jurisdictions have stayed with the
traditional corporate rules, while others have expanded the
exceptions to allow plaintiffs to recover. The result is a lack of
uniformity in this area of the law. As noted in Turner, corpo-
rate principles are inappropriate to determine tort liability for
defective products. 10' Since corporate law still determines suc-
91. Id.
92. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
93. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
94. 397 Mich. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 878, 881-82.
95. Id. at __, 244 N.W.2d at 882.
96. 379 F. Supp. at 801, discussed at note 58 supra.
97. This includes the purchasing corporation holding itself out to the world as a
continuation of the selling corporation. 397 Mich. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 882.
98. Dissolution is an important factor because the public policy argument loses its
validity where the original manufacturer is capable of responding to plaintiff's claims.
99. 397 Mich. at __, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
100. Id. at __, 244 N.W.2d at 880. The court felt that the difference between
consideration in stock and consideration in cash was only a difference in degree and
not a difference in kind. Id. at _-_- 244 N.W.2d at 883.
101. Id. at __, 244 N.W.2d at 878.
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cessor liability in most jurisdictions, now is the time for the
courts to realize that they should apply tort principles to solve
this tort problem.
IV. TORT LAW
Ray v. Alad Corp."0 2 is the first case to refuse to apply the
corporate law theories of liability to a successor corporation for
torts of its predecessor and to impose liability solely on the
basis of the strict tort doctrine. The plaintiff in Ray was injured
while using a defective ladder manufactured by Alad I, a fam-
ily corporation with an excellent reputation in the ladder in-
dustry. Less than one year before the accident, Alad I acquired
all of Alad I's 'manufacturing assets,' its real estate, plant and
offices, equipment and machinery, inventory and good will."' r 3
Alad I was dissolved one month after the date of the sales
agreement.'"4
The trial court had granted Alad I's motion for summary
judgment, based on the provisions of the sales contract.105 The
California Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing the case as
one of tort law and not contract0 6 or corporate law. In holding
the successor corporation liable for the defective product man-
ufactured by its predecessor, the Ray court held that the form
of transfer was irrelevant and that liability should run with the
manufacturing business. The court's reasons were twofold: (1)
The obligation to improve the product was on the successor;
and (2) the successor corporation can spread the loss through
its pricing policy."0 7
It follows that Alad I, having assumed Alaa I's preemi-
nent position in the ladder industry and being the entity
which continues to make and market Alad ladders, must as-
sume the liability for defects in the product of the enterprise
whose good will it purchased and legitimately exploits. This
102. 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976), vacated, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d
3, 136 Cal. Rptr, 574 (1977). See also 30 VMD. L. Ray. 238, 249 (1977).
103. 55 Cal. App. 3d at _ 127 Cal. Rptr. at 819. The successor corporation used
the same plant, the same employees, the same equipment, the same trade name, the
same sales force and solicited the same customers. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Therefore, the contract provisions limiting liability for defects in ladders man-
ufactured prior to sale were irrelevant to the question of liability of the successor
corporation to an injured third party. Id. at -, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20.
107. Id. at -, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
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